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China's Accession to the WTO: Economic Costs
Abstract
In 2001, China achieved accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) after more than ten years of
politically charged negotiations. The unusually long negotiation period was an indicator of the
controversy surrounding the issue, which remains heated to this day. Since China’s accession,
economists and politicians around the world have been watching to monitor the outcome after the five
year phase-in period. While China’s economic gains have been significant, and the increase in exports
dramatic, China’s accession to the WTO has had numerous negative effects. Some of these negative
effects are the adverse impacts on the environment, the disparity in wages between rural and urban
citizens, the displacement of neighboring countries’ exports, and China’s increased skill in utilizing the
WTO’s loopholes.
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CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO:
ECONOMIC COSTS
Manh Dao, Cathy Geehan & Joshua Pandian
In 2001, China achieved accession into
the World Trade Organization (WTO) after more
than ten years of politically charged negotiations.
The unusually long negotiation period was an indicator of the controversy surrounding the issue,
which remains heated to this day. Since China’s
accession, economists and politicians around the
world have been watching to monitor the outcome after the five year phase-in period. While
China’s economic gains have been significant,
and the increase in exports dramatic, China’s accession to the WTO has had numerous negative
effects. Some of these negative effects are the
adverse impacts on the environment, the disparity in wages between rural and urban citizens, the
displacement of neighboring countries’ exports,
and China’s increased skill in utilizing the WTO’s
loopholes.
To best understand the implications, the
WTO’s history and Chinese involvement should be
reviewed. The WTO came into being as a result
of various negotiations. Serving primarily as a mediator for consultations between member nations
regarding world trade procedures and disputes,
the WTO stems from the Uruguay Round, which
spanned from 1986 to 1994. These negotiations
were done under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and became the successor
of the GATT in 1995. The WTO is composed of 153
member states, with 30 serving as observers. The
observers typically are states seeking permanent
status. A common misconception about the WTO
is that it expedites talks between countries and
helps lower trade barriers to promote free trade.
This is true; however it is not exclusively the work of
the WTO. There are situations where certain barriers remain in place to avoid exploitations that
could directly affect consumers, such as when
some loopholes allow corporations to forgo certain environmental regulations. Essentially, the
purpose of the WTO is to allow the free flow of
trade internationally, so long as the undesirable
effects are minimized. The WTO emphasizes transparency, enforceable agreements, reciprocity,
safety valves and non-discrimination. Out of the
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five, non-discrimination is arguably the most essential to the WTO. This can be seen in its Most Favored Nation policies, which are designed to ensure that no one nation is favored above another
so that free trade can be more easily facilitated.
It is what makes WTO such a broad organization.
The most notable thing that comes along
with the magnificent increase in trade volume
since 2001 is the deteriorating natural conditions
for China. The pro-liberalization scholars have
long reasoned that trade can be beneficial to the
environment. One argument they make is that
China could change its producing methods and
technology to waste less resources and generate
less pollution, and the government could raise
the environmental standards. However, it is found
that in China’s case, the sheer increase in scale
far outweighs other effects. In order to produce
more and take advantages of the opening markets, production in China has expanded rapidly,
which means the amount of resources and the
amount of waste have also increased exponentially.
Under the WTO regime, the sectors of
China’s economy that have grown the most are
tha agriculture, aquaculture, textile, and industries. China’s textile and apparel exports grew by
more than 40 percent while its cotton consumption expanded by 34 percent over the first three
years of joining the WTO, and is still growing at a
significant speed; its growth in 2010 was 10%. This
industry has one of the largest ecological footprints: it consumes a lot of water, and releases a
lot of harmful chemicals as waste into the rivers
and other water sources. In China, the technology, although improved, is still inferior to that of the
developed nations: “water consumption per unit
of production is about 50 per cent higher than in
developed countries … Dyes made in China usually have lower dye uptake and . . . dye residual in
wastewater is higher … The sewer discharge per
product is nearly double the amount discharged
in developed countries.” (Jahiel, 317)
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Furthermore, a thorough modernizing program is nearly impossible – as Jahiel states that the
small firms are the primary producers of textile, accounting for about 85% of all cotton textile manufacturers, and they have low access to financial
sources and cutting-edge technology. The WTO
helps worsen the situation in another way; the foreign direct investment (FDI) mostly flows to those
small factories, because foreign investors simply
want the profits these environment-harming factories can potentially make.
To cope with the fast growth in manufacturing, the raw resource industries are also augmented. China is already the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal, the main resources
used to produce electricity. And coal mining
requires the demolition of mountains and land.
“According to the 2005 China Environmental Report, about five billion tons of soil are washed way
annually in the region, one third of which comes
from Shanxi, Shaanxi and IMAR” (the poor northwestern part of China) (Zhu, 14). Not to mention
the toxic water discharge and the farmland occupied or destroyed by coal mining.
The rise in volume and variety of trade
caused by the WTO creates yet another problem:
the introduction of exotic, potentially invasive,
species around the world. Ecologists have found
many marine creatures in the ballast water of the
ships (the water stored in the bottom of a ship to
keep it balance) and many insects in the packing crates, accidentally carried from China to the
U.S and vice versa. With the similar climates, those
species can easily establish and cause ecological disasters. In 2000, it is calculated that it costs
the U.S. around $137 billion per year to deal with
the invasive species, and for China, it is $2.4 billion per year - only eight industries are calculated,
which means the actual figure might be greater
(Normile).
Statistics show inequality in China also increased at an alarming speed in the 2000s. The
year 2009 marks the widest rural-urban income
gap in China; the income ratio between the urban and rural population reached 3:33 to 1, and is
predicted to keep rising (China Daily). During the
high times of FDI inflows since China’s WTO’s accession, the urban areas and the industrial zones
have attracted much attention, leaving the rural
areas virtually untouched. While the impoverished people’s net income is shown to increase,

it is nowhere near the amount earned by “the
managers of State-owned enterprises, real estate
developers and some private companies”. (China Daily) Additionally, the percentage of rural enrollments in elite universities have shrunk from 50
percent in the 1950s to 17.6 percent in 2000, and
it is widely agreed by experts that the figure might
be as low as 1 percent in 2010 (Newsweek). These
trends actually already happened before the
WTO’s membership; they are direct consequences of the rapid industrial growth, and especially
the increase in FDI, as proved in Wan’s article. It
is not prudent to say that the WTO is the cause
of these problems. However, it helps open up the
market and encourages the investors to come to
China, so the WTO has its indirect responsibility in
worsening the inequality issue in China.
Not directly caused by the WTO’s accession, the notoriety of Chinese products originated
from a period of rapid export production. The Chinese government chose exports to be the focus of
economic development after it joined the WTO.
GDP growth was deemed more important than
anything, and many quality controls are neglected. In 2008, evidence that melamine, a chemical
usually used in making plastics, was found in a Chinese baby formula and shocked the entire world.
It was further revealed that virtually all Chineseproduced dairy products, including ordinary milk,
ice cream, and yogurt also contained melamine.
The structure of the dairy-processing chain is one
of the factors that contributed to the poisoning of
more than 290,000 people, and 6 deaths. Modern
factories, the ones who received the FDI, still get
raw materials from small, poor, uneducated families who are desperate to make money. They can
easily mix some melamine, which is very accessible and cheap, to increase the nitrogen content
– the protein level of the milk. The Chinese government, only focusing on production, neglects
its role of inspection and quality controls (Xiu,
467). Also, the news about lead in children’s toys
imported from China made consumers around
the world fear the astonishingly cheap products
again, which they bought, due to the help of
the WTO. In the long term, China’s product quality might be improved because the government
wants to keep its reputation in the WTO, yet the
problems are very pervasive and have roots in
such basic stages that it will be very hard to fix
them.
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Due to China’s geographical size, its
abundance of highly elastic, low-cost labor supply, and the overall liberalization of trade due to
its accession into the WTO, it is uniquely equipped
to attract foreign investment. China’s rapid
growth has “triggered fears of increased competition for developing countries and hollowing out
of manufacturing firms in advanced countries”
(Greenaway, 153). First, developing countries that
deal in similar exports, such as agricultural goods,
textile products, and manufactured commodities, could see their export figures cannibalized
by increased production of those goods in China.
These countries are, for the most part, countries
geographically close to China, such as Thailand
and the Philippines. Because they are geographically close, their resources are similar, causing
them to compete in similar sectors. Due to China’s
overwhelming influence in world trade, products
from these smaller countries are often neglected
for products of similar quality from China. It can
be argued that, in the long run, importers would
rather import from China because of China’s stability and the opportunity for trade from China’s
other sectors. This would also open the door for
future foreign direct investment in China from the
importing nations. As a result, smaller neighboring countries can potentially be priced out of the
market in the aforementioned sectors.
Similarly, developed countries fear that
the shift of Chinese industries from the primary
sector to manufacturing will take away from their
own exports. More developed nations in the Asian
region such as Japan and South Korea have already shifted resources into high tech manufacturing sectors in anticipation of China’s growth,
but China is starting to encroach on those sectors
as well. With China’s resources and manpower,
this poses a significant threat for the economies
of those developed nations (Greenaway, 153).
Essentially, developed nations will suffer market
share losses while developing nations would find
their exponential growth curbed by China’s influence. Though it is impossible to say whether or not
China will continue to develop at the same rate,
the progress it has made since its accession into
the WTO and the access to new markets has given them the ability to economically cannibalize
its neighbors. China’s exports grow at an average
of 19.7%, compared to 7.1% for other Asian countries with similar exports and 8.7% for the world’s
developing economies (Greenaway, 157).
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Not only economically, China is taking
steps into the legal side of international trade.
It has become skilled in exploiting the nature of
the WTO legal body, the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB), since its accession in 2001. China has had,
to date, 23 cases brought up against it in the WTO,
primarily stemming from the United States and the
European Union (EU), although usually third parties will join in on the proceedings.
At the beginning, China was very naïve.
The first case brought against China was in 2004;
it was an accusation by the United States about
the Value-Added Tax (VAT) on Integrated Circuits.
China was accused of giving a partial refund to
Chinese enterprises on integrated circuits, resulting in a lower VAT (“China – Value”). The case was
fairly straightforward; China hastily removed the
partial refund for enterprises in China. Third parties
included the EU, Japan, and Mexico. China and
the US reached an agreement without having to
request the formation of a panel by the DSB. Yet,
after its five-year phase-in period, China began
to utilize the knowledge it had gained sitting in as
a third party on various negotiations. In 2006 Canada, the US, and the EU brought an accusation
against China concerning the imports of automobile parts because China was increasing the tariff
on auto parts “from 10% to 25%, the same as the
rate charge on imported foreign-made vehicles,
if the parts comprise more than 60%” of the automobile (Zhang, 6). Instead of cooperating with
the complainants, in this case China allowed proceedings to be carried out to their full term, and
due to a lack of retrospective compensation, China did not have to compensate for “any damages made during the litigation process at the WTO,
which can easily take two years” (Zhang, 14). Following the panel ruling, China even went so far
as to appeal the decision, causing another two
months of discussion and prolonging their practices (“China – Measures Affecting Imports”). Similar
tactics were taken by China in cases such as the
case for intellectual property rights in China and
the case regarding procedures that affect trading rights and distribution services for products of
an audiovisual nature (“China – Audiovisual Entertainment Products,” “China – Intellectual Property
Rights”).
The most recent case brought up against
China involves electronic payment services. Foreign suppliers are forced to go through a Chinese
entity for electronic payment services, which
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causes those suppliers to use the undervalued
Yuan instead of their domestic currency (“China
– Certain”). There are also inconsistencies regarding payment methods for other members
of the WTO because access is guaranteed to all
merchants that use the Chinese entity, while others are forced to negotiate for access. The main
complainant is the United States, with third parties
including Australia, Ecuador, the EU, Guatemala,
Japan, and the Republic of Korea. It is important
to note that of the third parties involved, five of
them are major players in world trade, indicating
that this issue holds serious weight for a large portion of the economic world. This issue has yet to
be fully resolved, yet the request for consultations
was made on September 15, 2010, with a panel
yet to be formed (“China – Certain”). Due to the
procedures of the WTO and the complexity of the
case, it is doubtful that it will be resolved in the
near future. In fact, it is most likely that it will be
drawn out like previous cases, which could have
a severe impact on the world economy. This is
just one example from the recent history of cases
brought up against China that have yet to be explored or even discussed. In the meantime, China
remains free to continue its practices unregulated. It should be noted that if China had not joined
the WTO, other countries would have been able
to legitimately punish China with tariffs and other
trade barriers, forcing China to follow the general
rules of the market. Its WTO membership definitely
provides an edge for its legal maneuvering.
Not only has China learned how to use the
WTO system to its advantage, there is ample data
from the 1990s that shows they have been growing significantly without the WTO, and by joining
the WTO China now faces more red tape, as do
its trading partners (Greenaway 152). While this is
not a point often thought about, it is something
worth considering when taking into accounts the
risks and benefits of China in the WTO.
It is difficult to discern whether the negative changes brought by and upon China would
have still occurred had it not joined the WTO, but
certain elements of the WTO have a clear correlation with effects in the world. Due to its accession,
China was able to shift towards a more industrial
style of economy, which has had a distinct effect
on the environment of China, particularly in the
water supply. While wage disparity could have
occurred regardless of whether or not China
joined the WTO, the influx of manufacturing work

surely influenced the widening gap between the
urban and rural communities. Other Asian countries have experienced a decrease in exports due
to China’s rapidly expanding export sector. Before
China joined the WTO, the various agreements it
had with other nations would be enforced on that
nation’s terms. Now given that China is a part of
the WTO, other nations are forced to work through
the laws of the system, a system that China is very
adept at manipulating. Overall, while there are
numerous positive effects of China’s accession,
the risks outweigh the benefits in this case.
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